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ABSTRACT
CAPITAL’S RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION:
“A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ADJUSTMENT PATTERNS 
OF MARK-UPS IN POST-LIBERALIZATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES”
Buturak, Gökhan 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: A. Erinç Yeldan 
September 2004
In this thesis, I investigate the capital’s response to the new world 
economic order termed as “globalization”. It is asserted in many theoretical and 
popular writings that increased pressures of global competition would squeeze the 
profit margins and reduce capital returns. I discuss this proposition theoretically 
and then test for it using manufacturing data for a selected group of developing 
countries under post-liberalization. I utilize time series and panel data 
econometrics to study the behavior of markups (gross profit margins) against wage 
costs, trade openness, and investment share in the GDP as a proxy for capacity 
utilization. Contrary to expectations, I find no significant conclusive evidence on 
the sign of “openness” on profit margins in many countries of my sample. My 
results also reveal that though mark-ups are negatively related with real wage costs 
in most of the Latin American countries in my sample, they have a positive and 
statistically significant relation to real wage costs in Turkish manufacturing. 
Finally, investment shares and mark-ups reveal a negative relationship for 
Argentina and Turkey and a positive one for Colombia.
Key words: mark-ups, profit margins, globalization, distribution, manufacturing 
industry
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ÖZET
SERMAYE’NÎN KÜRESELLEŞMEYE YAMTI: 
“LİBERALİZASYON SONRASI GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELERDE BRÜT 
KÂR MARJLARININ DÜZENLEME PATERNLERİNİN 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ”
Buturak, Gökhan 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: A. Erinç Yeldan 
Eylül 2004
Bu tezde, sermayenin küreselleşme olarak adlandınlan yeni ekonomik 
dünya düzenine yanıtı araştınhyor. Çoğu popüler yazmda, artan küresel rekabet 
baskılarmm kâr maıjlannı daraltması ve sermayeye dönen payı azaltması 
vurgulanır. Bu çalışmada, belirtilen önerme tartışılıp, seçilmiş bir grup gelişmekte 
olan ülkenin serbestleştirme sonrası imâlât sanayi verisi kullamlarak test 
edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, brüt kâr maıjlarmm maaş maliyetlerine, ticari açıklığa 
ve kapasite kullanımına yaklaşım olarak kullamlan yatmmm gayrisafi yurtiçi 
hasıladaki payma karşı davranışım ortaya koymak için zaman serisi ve panel data 
ekonometrisinden faydalamlmaktadır. Beklenilenin aksine, ömeklem olarak alman 
ülkelerin çoğunda dışa açıklığm işareti üzerine hiçbir anlamlı sonuca 
vanimamıştır. Sonuçlar, ömeklemimde yer alan çoğu Latin Amerika ülkesi için 
brüt kâr maıjlarmm maaş maliyetleriyle eksi illişkilendiğini ortaya koysa da 
Türkiye imâlât sanayii için bunlarm istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir şekilde artı 
ilişkilendiğini göstermektedir. Son olarak, yatırım paylan ve brüt kâr maıjlan 
Aıjantin ve Türkiye için eksi, Kolombiya için artı yönlü bir ilişki ortaya 
koymaktadırlar.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Brüt kâr maıjlan, kâr maıjlan, küreselleşme, bölüşüm, imalât 
sanayii
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
In this thesis, I investigate the capital’s response to new conditions set forth 
by pressures of globalization in selected developing countries. Globalization, in its 
narrowest economic sense, entails a process of integration of the domestic 
commodity and financial markets with the world market at large. Alleged by the 
neoclassical scholars, the increased pressures of international competition would 
squeeze the profit margins and reduce the rate of return available for capital. For a 
well-functioning competitive market economy, the Hekscher-Ohlin model predicts, 
for instance, that profits are negatively correlated with the degree of openness of the 
economy if the sector is capital-intensive (see, e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1996). In 
fact, a well-known proposition of both the classical and neoclassical economics is 
that profits ultimately vanish in a “well-functioning” market economy.
That these a priori theoretical presumptions fail to hold for a large sample of 
countries in the aftermath of their liberalization attempts is well-documented. Since 
the extensive inception of the neoliberal programs of structural adjustment and 
external liberalization in the late-1970s, the share of labor in national income is 
observed to have serious setbacks. It fell, for instance, from 48% to 38% in Chile, 
from 41% to 25% in Argentina, and from 38% to 27% in Mexico (Veltmeyer, 
1999). During this era capital laimched a direct assault on wage labor against its
wage remunerations, working conditions and benefits, as well as its capacity to 
organize and negotiate contracts (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001).
What this evidence suggests is that capital could have the means emd power 
to adapt to the new conditions of intensified competition so as to be able to secure 
its rate of return and to protect -and even to expand— its share in gross output. As 
Meszaros puts it, “the crucial condition for the existence and functioning of capital 
is that it should be able to exercise command over labor. .. Without it, capital would 
cease to be capital and disappear from the historical stage.” (Meszaros, 1995: 609, 
italics original).
Under these circumstances, “flexibility” in production patterns conduced a 
viable opportunity for the capitalist to enjoy profits and/or to survive in the market 
by tidying the composition of its production and distribution patterns. In a classical 
sense, the main tool for the capitalist for adaptation to the changing market 
environment is labor saving techniques, which work through regressing the labor’s 
share in output either by labor shedding, in other words, reducing the number of 
employees and increasing the intensity of work for the remaining workers to reach 
increased productivity gains, or repressing the labor costs via adjusting wages in a 
band of subsistence wage level and value-added per worker.
Thus, my imderlying hypothesis in this thesis is based on the classical notion 
that resolution of the distributional conflict is prior to accumulation and production, 
rather than the orthodox (neoclassical) presumption that the distributional patterns 
are passive outcomes of the underlying technology and the contemplation that profit 
is a payment/retum to a scarce productive factor, capital. Hence, rather than 
interpreting the realized factor shares as neutral outcomes of the free interplay of
competitive market forces with technology, I regard profit as a politically and 
socially determined entity that is created, extracted, and distributed by the 
authoritative/administrative actions, given the socioeconomic and structural 
parameters. For capital such adjustment processes are completed via surplus 
extraction and surplus creation, where the former term indicates the capitalist’s 
ability to sustain its own share over wages and other costs, and the latter term 
indicates a process of rearrangement of surplus through administrative actions of 
organized capital and the state (Yeldan, 1995).
It is the purpose of this thesis to discuss theoretically the patterns of 
distribution and then investigate empirically the patterns of adjustment of capital 
returns against forces of global competition. In the theoretical discussion, I present 
various models of structural change and discuss their results within power relations 
and institutional adjustments. In the empirical investigation of behavior of capital 
returns against forces of global competition, I use manufacturing sector data for a 
group of post-liberalization developing coimtries, and utilize time series and panel 
data econometric methods to deduce hypotheses on the patterns of external 
liberalization, wage costs, and profitability of Argentine, Chilean, Colombian, 
Mexican, Venezuelan and Turkish manufacturing sectors. The period under analysis 
comprises the liberal policy implantations, which brought in phases the demolition 
of international trade and financial barriers in the aforesaid coimtries. In this period, 
the distributional patterns between wage-labor and capital have been reshaped due 
to those structural changes and as a sector carrying these patterns of transformation, 
manufacturing industry is an eligible focal point for analysis. As an empirical 
measure of capital’s rate of return, I utilize the mark-up rates (gross profit margins
over costs), defined as the ratio of total profits to total costs of wages and 
intermediate inputs. In the absence of reliable capital stock estimates, this variable 
provides a good proxy for the rate of profit.
The plan of the thesis is as follows: in the next chapter an assessment of 
theories within distributive framework under different settings will be made. Then 
in chapter 3 ,1 provide a broad overview of the history of macro adjustments for the 
countries in my sample. I introduce my econometric methodology in chapter 4, and 
analyze my empirical findings in chapter 5. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes.
CHAPTER 2
A Theoretical Assessment of Distribution
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss theoretically the patterns of 
distribution. In this sense, I will present various models illustrating structural 
change and discuss their results within power relations and institutional 
adjustments. In order to prepare the reader for the models that will be discussed 
later on, I will narrate theories of value and prominence of market structure and its 
implications as preliminaries to the chapter.
2.1 Preliminary
2.1.1 Theories of Value
In order to review the theoretical models regarding distribution, it is
convenient to overview the theories of value since distributional explanations are
constructed on different theories of value. As Marx (1973) points out,
“In order to develop the concept of capital, it is necessary to begin not with labor 
but with value, or more precisely, with the exchange value already developed in 
the movement of circulation. It is just as impossible to pass directly from labor 
to capital as from the different races of men directly to the banker, or from 
nature to the steam engine.”
The main theories of value are the Marxian theory of value and marginal 
theory of value. I will overview them as briefly as possible in the following 
subsections.
Marginal utility theory goes back to Jevons. The main argument is on the 
scarcity of resources, that is, value is derived from the scarcity of the commodity: 
any additional amoxmt of the commodity is valued at declining utility terms; unless 
the corranodity is scarce, all increments of the commodity in consideration would 
have little or no value. Yet, the use value and exchange value of the commodity are 
defined as the subjective link between the individual and the commodity by the 
marginalist theorists (Mandel, 1974). Quoting Mandel (1974) on the theory of 
marginal utility,
“A man obviously has more need of bread and water than of a diamond. Yet a 
diamond has a higher exchange-value than that of bread. A man has even more 
‘need of air’, which normally possesses no exchange value. This is why the neo­
classical theory states: it is not the intensity of the need in itself, but the intensity 
of the last fragment o f need not satisfied (of the marginal utility) that determines 
value.”
Taking capital and labor as commodities exchanged on the market, the value 
(or the reward) attributed to these factors of production will be determined just the 
same as a commodity valued by the exchange process in the market. That is, 
contribution of any additional labor or capital will be assessed as the rewards of the 
respective factors in the production process, just as in the exchange process; i.e., the 
value of the commodity is determined by the contribution of additional amoxmt of 
any commodity to the utility of the individual. In this sense, marginalists identify 
factor rewards as the marginal contribution o f the factor o f production to the 
production process. Thus, marginal productivity theory contends that in equilibrium 
each productive agent will be rewarded in accordance with its marginal product as 
measured by the effect on the total product of the addition or withdrawal of a unit of
2.1.1.1 Marginal Theory of Value
that agent, the quantity of the other agents being held constant. In the end, the 
whole system is in perfect static equilibrium, “profit” itself having disappeared 
since under conditions of perfect competition the value of the marginal product - 
which determines the value of all production- is dissolved into depreciated capital, 
wages, interest and round-rent (Mandel, 1974) as asserted by Flux’s product 
exhaustion theorem (see, e.g. Dobb, 1973). More clearly, the marginal cost should 
determine the exchange value, or say price, of the commodity.
The theory of marginal productivity had been preponderant along the 
debates of the economic circum of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One 
of the main coxmterarguments was that marginal rewards were immeasurable and 
even unobservable. For a long time, the marginalist school was unable to determine 
the marginal value of capital goods. In the end, it managed to do this only by 
introducing, with Bohm-Bawerk, the notion of a roundaboutness of production, 
which becomes more and more intensified as capital goods increasingly enter into 
the process (Mandel, 1974).
Another controversial attack was firom the Cambridge School, which is 
named as the renowned Cambridge Controversy. Joan Robinson (1956) stressed on 
the unaccoimtability of the total capital accrued in the economy which in turn 
determines the capital remunerations. In other words, the stock of capital in an 
economy cannot be measured wifiiout knowing the rate of interest and hence the 
production function cannot be used to determine the rate of interest as the marginal 
product of that capital.
Marx uses value as not to refer to the use or exchange value merely; the 
word value (sometimes Marx calls it commodity value) is used by Marx in a very 
specific meaning as the aspect of a commodity which allows it to be exchanged on 
the market. Value is not an ethical category, and it also does not indicate a 
subjective valuation (how much someone values something); indeed Marx uses 
this word to denote an economic category which finds its expression m the market 
price (Ehrbar, 1998). The word value has this specific meaning throughout his 
work Capital.
Marx relates the use value and exchange value by alienation and
appropriation processes of the commodity in the market. In his own words,
“Well, how does use value turn into a commodity? By being a bearer of 
exchange value. Although they are immediately united in the commodity, use 
value and exchange value equally immediately fall asunder. Exchange value 
appears not determined by use value and, moreover, the commodity only 
becomes a commodity, only realizes itself as exchange value, to the extent 
that its owner does not relate to it as use value. Only by alienating it, by 
exchanging it for other commodities does he appropriate use values. 
Appropriation by means of alienation is the basic form of the social system of 
production of which exchange value appears as the simplest, most abstract 
expression.” (Marx, 1973)
2.1.1.2 Marxian Theory of Value
Marx, different from the marginalists, isolates the “substance” of value 
from the “forms” in which value presents itself to the economic agents. The 
substance of value originates from the objective means of existence of that 
commodity, production; whereas the facets of this substance are related to the 
subjectivity of individuals and their interactions. Marx distinguishes between three 
determinations o f value: its substance, its quantity, and its form. The content of 
these determinations is human labor in the abstract (i.e., the expenditure of labor-
power), socially necessary labor time, and a social relation (i.e. the interactions of 
a commodity-producing society).
The commodity in the production process amends in terms of value with the 
attribution of value by the intangible labor power, which is the abstraction of human 
labor into something that can be exchanged for money. The relation of labor power 
to the actual labor of a private individual is analogous to the relation of exchange 
value to use value. The exchange value of labor power is bought and paid for by the 
capitalist, but what is actually skipped by the capitalist is that the use value of labor 
is not paid at its full value. That is, laborer gets the natural remuneration that the 
market finds apt and is enough for replenishment of the laborer, but creates an 
economic surplus more than he is rewarded. Consequently, the worker is exploited 
insofar as the capitalist appropriates the surplus created by the laborer in the 
production process as the reward or profit.
2.1.2 Market Structure
Market structure before and after the implementation of neoliberal programs 
of structural adjustment forms the evolution of distribution between labor and 
capital. With external openness and deregulation, it is expected that indigenous 
markets become more competitive and thus the distributive patterns between capital 
owners and labor will adjust to a new rule that is perceived as the efficient and 
natural allocation rule (see, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). The new equilibrium 
reached now with more actors in the producer-side of the market is supposed to be 
the end result of the responses of actors of the markets, i.e. capital owners and 
workers each implementing their non-strategic-interdependent decisions with no
blocking coalitions (see, e.g. Green et al., 1995). Hence, returns to factors of 
production are closer to the naturality of what classical marginal theory puts 
forward as reflecting the marginal contributions to production.
However, in real life markets do not work competitively to assert marginal 
pricing of factor contributions. Existence of such markets is dubious that standard 
textbooks give examples of auction-like instantly adjusting markets as stock 
exchange markets (see, e.g. Green et al., 1995). Even if marginal pricing holds, 
there is the issue of measurement as pointed out Robinson (1956) and other 
Cambridge scholars: Whose marginal contribution is in what amoxmt?
Moreover, the dense market dynamics with many producers do not 
guarantee the perpetuation of competition since firms form blocking coalitions and 
hierarchical networked structures. As intensified in the last decade, mergers have 
been occurring between firms in order to internalize the negative externalities 
generated by competition. Tier relations as hierarchical networked structures are 
sources of noncompetitive market formations as well where there appear few firms 
with no productional activities at the top of the organization with many supply 
chains at the sub-organizational levels (Gereffi, 1999). Even without any merger or 
tier relation, it can be said that a mechanism of natural selection would probably 
shrink the market with eliminating the weak firms and strengthening the existence 
of strong firms which maintained widespread availability, brand popularity, 
customer trust, and on-the-fi"ont technological position. Sweezy and Baran (1966) in 
their classical work ‘Monopoly Capitalism’ and Dobb (1967) emphasize the role of 
advertisements as sources of gaining immunity for the firms to survive in the 
market via creating and perpetuating effective demand for the commodity produced.
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Moreover, Galbraith (1967) draws attention to the stock structures of largest 
corporations in the United States, while Dobb (1967) narrates this fact for United 
Kingdom, where ownership of these corporations are concentrated in less than one 
percent of total stockholders.
As a result, other than taking the competitive market structure as granted, I 
will review on some other market stmctures in order to determine the model that 
will be utilized in the empirical study which will appear later on. The Marxian 
analysis of capitalism rests on the assumption of a competitive economy. However, 
Sweezy and Baran (1966) put forward that capitalism has undergone a qualitative 
change hy turning into monopoly capitalism. Marx, as Sweezy and Baran (1966) 
narrate, treated monopolies not as essential elements of capitalism but rather as 
remnants of the feudal mercantilist past which had to be abstracted from newborn 
capitalism in order to attain the clearest possible view of the basic stmcture and 
tendencies of capitalism. However, some parts of Capital refer to capital 
competition and to the elimination of competition by way of competition, i.e. to the 
centralization and concentration of capital (Mattack, 1978). For Baran and Sweezy 
(1966), there should be a frmdamental structural change in the Marxian analysis of 
capitalism, from competitive to monopoly capitalism.
On the other hand, Kalecki, and thus new structuralists, used oligopolistic 
market structures in their models. The main upsurge of oligopolistic market 
strueture is that markup pricing rule represents the price setting behavior of such a 
market structure although the standard neoclassical textbooks narrate this as 
approximation to the oligopolistic price setting. Using markup pricing is also
11
Marxian in the sense that Marx defined prices as the total cost of production plus 
the profit.
To summarize, competitive market ceases to disappear with the diminishing 
number of market actors with certain mechanisms in order to perpetuate the 
profitability within the market. In any case, a neoclassical framework is worth of 
considering for demonstration of the distributive process in a Active economy 
where markets are competitive and thus production is carried on with decreasing 
returns and marginal factor payments are used as the distribution rule. Presenting 
such a fictive economy necessitates presenting other setups with different market 
structures. Proceeding section and its subsections will try to narrate these model, 
power relations, and deregulation of markets as the altering factors of the 
distributive patterns between capital and labor.
2.2 Trade Liberalization and Distribution
This section will try to demonstrate the trade liberalization and its 
consequences in terms of distribution between capital and labor with models 
constructed under different market structures and assumptions. The basic tenets of 
each model will be discussed and then an assessment on distributional outcomes 
will follow for each model.
2.2.1 A Neoclassical Setting under Decreasing Returns
According to classical theories of international trade, trade exposure does 
appear to exert additional competitive pressure on markups either because it reduces 
the economywide returns to capital or because it disciplines noncompetitive pricing
12
behavior. It is easy to show why this might not hold under a neoclassical 
intertemporal production setting with decreasing returns. Assximing two coimtries, 
one with high capital intensity and the other with low capital intensity, a standard 
Cobb-Douglass production function satisfying Inada conditions, Hicks-neutral 
technology and marginal factor payments, capitalist’s problem can be stated as:
K , L  s = t
The problem states that the choice of the capitalist is at a point where the 
marginal contributions of the factors of production are equal to the remunerations of 
each factor of production and further points pull the marginal contributions of the 
factors of production below their remimerations. Rearranging the equation in terms 
of capital per labor, first order conditions, which reflect the marginal factor 
payments, imply the following relations:
(2) A J \ K )  = r,
The concavity of the production function ensures that the cormtry with high 
capital intensity will surely have low returns to capital so that there appears an 
arbitrage condition between two countries, leading to flow of capital fi"om capital- 
intensive country to capital-scarce country and eventually returns to capital 
equalize. Moreover, labor remunerations in the backward region will be lower 
compared to the other region. Thus, pressures of more gains due to high return to 
capital and low wages in the backward region will mandate the rules of the game: 
External liberalization with market deregulation. Consequently, integration with 
world markets, i.e. external liberalization with market deregulation, will increase
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the number of firms in a particular industry competing with each other, which in 
turn conduces to a shift fi’om noncompetitive pricing with higher profits to 
competitive pricing with low profits. On the other hand, labor remunerations have 
the trajectory stated as equation (3). Log-differentiation of equation (3) and 
rearranging terms will give the relation between growth of wages and technology 
growth, growth of capital stock and growth of returns to capital. 
{ A ) w , = 2 A , - { \ - 2 a ) k , - r ,
Equation (4) states that there is a negative relation between growth of wages 
and growth of capital stock per labor and growth of returns to capital. Technology, 
in tiiis setting, remains to be positively related to wages in accord with the 
assumption that it is Hicks-neutral. Changing this assumption to Harrod-neutrality, 
however, alters the relation. The implication of this alteration stems from the 
question of whether technology increases capital’s productivity alone, or labor’s 
productivity alone, or both. To put it mathematically, following the same procedure, 
we get the Harrod-neutral version of equation (4):
(5) w = 2(1 -  a) A -  (1 -  2a)k -  r
Rearranging terms yields to the growth of returns to capital in terms of 
growth of wages, technology and capital.
(6) r - 2 { \ -  a)A -  (1 -  2a)ic -  w
Equation (6) reveals that keeping returns to capital or increasing it in the 
existence of competitive pressures is possible through technology improvements, 
wage reduction, and capital retardation (or labor saving, since k is capital to labor 
ratio). The orthodox rhetoric states that distribution of economic surplus is a natural
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outcome of the free interplay between capital and labor, i.e. the decisions of capital 
owners and workers made intertemporally. Under this fictive neoclassical setting, 
however, a political assessment on the investigation of how capital owners 
responded to external liberalization wave can be narrated through this equation with 
the analysis of each variable in equation (6).
Capital Formation
Assuming that labor used in the production is fixed, appending new capital 
would lower profits as stated mathematically in equation (6) that the relation 
between profit rates and capital formation per labor is negative. Thus, response of 
capital owners to increase profits would never be appending new capital to existing 
capital in this fictive economy. Capital accumulation in the economy would, 
however, be in terms of foreign direct investment since the profit rates are desirable 
in the backward region, and thus indigenous capital owners would face with 
competition. As Lucas (1990) speculates on the capital outflow in developing 
countries saying that capital inflows are deliberately impeded in developing 
countries in order to keep the profit rates high and wage rates low, capital flows 
were not observed in developing countries contrary to what the neoclassical theory 
suggests. Even, the observed type of foreign direct investment is either in the form 
of equity buying or io the form of merging, which do not contribute to domestic 
accumulation of capital (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). For the indigenous 
entrepreneur, however, reluctance to increments to capital can be explaiaed by 
Kalecki’s (1943) ‘principle of increasing risk’. According to the principle of 
increasing risk, the subjective risk to the firm of increased indebtedness rises with 
every increase in the amount of borrowed capital relative to equity capital. Thus,
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capitalist stands reluctant to append new capital, so that we expect a low level of 
capital formation.
Technological Advancement and Foreign Direct Investment
Technology improvements are costly since the massive initial infrastructure 
of research and development is costly, which then forms reluctance to indulge in 
such activities. Dissemination of technology is possible theoretically, however, if 
firms are subject to external economies. Technology imitation is possible as well 
through learning, regional proxy and labor turnover, as suggested in the literature 
on foreign direct investment (see, e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999), if not through 
patent and license agreements, which is in fact costly. Actually, a suggested driving 
force for both capital formation and technology improvements to progress in this 
setting is foreign direct investment.
For the alleged flows of direct investment due to the return differentials 
between two regions and its potential benefits, we have to look into the items tihat 
are listed as potential benefits of capital flows. According to the literature on 
foreign direct investment, the potential benefits of foreign direct investment are as 
follows:
- Employment effect
- Technology transfer to indigenous firms via some sort of spillover 
channels
- Productivity increase for domestic finns
- Employee training through on-the-job learning
- High wage spillovers
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The first item in the list is an undeniable fact that every new plant forms 
employment possibilities. Coming to technology spillovers, we see that the most 
mentioned benefit of foreign direct investment is this one. However, attaining 
technology through learning and regional proxy is particularly realistic, that is, such 
technology transmissions can be valid in sectors using non-esoteric technology with 
low complexity but not in the sectors using high-tech production technology. In 
other words, technology today is an intangible economic good that is marketed 
globally via patent rights that most of the firms buy technology if not counterfeit. 
Indeed, the transmission is mainly on managerial chaimel, not on technology; that 
is, indigenous firms learn how to better manage fi’om the foreign firms. Thus, 
productivity increases are via labor-saving since competition drives cost reduction, 
which makes the high wage spillovers redundant in the list. In addition, competition 
may wipe out small domestic firms causing an undesirable change in market 
concentrations leaving a small bunch of dominant firms in the sector, which share 
the noncompetitive rents. Consequently to say, expectations of technology 
transmissions, higher wages, and capital accumulation etcetera after external 
Uberalization seem not viable.
Wage Reduction
Ways of securing profits such as technology improvements, capital 
formation either domestically or in the form of foreign direct investment were told 
to be either ineffective or unattractive. Hegemony, to be the dominative while 
exonerative, finds itself to suppress the share of subordinate classes in hard times to 
the level where there appears arbitrary risk of appropriation.
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Thus, what remains in this setting as the plausible way of erecting profit 
trend for the capitalist within an environment of increased competition is to lower 
the share of labor, i.e. surplus extraction; or to do it via the help of state, i.e. surplus 
creation. In other words, trade liberalization in developing coxmtries should be 
accompanied by institutional adjustments in order to nourish the infant exporting 
sectors. The institutional shifts will be discussed later as a section since it is not the 
main issue at this point.
2.2.2 Economies of Scale and External Economies of Scale
A further discussion can be carried on with changing the assumption of 
decreasing returns to increasing returns with external economies as emphasized by 
Rrugman (1990). The essence of scale economies external to firms added to the 
standard setting is that unit capital and labor requirements of firms decrease as the 
level of capital used in the industry increases but with individual firms’ unit capital 
and labor requirement remaining constant. Thus, productivity increases occur only 
through new entrances into the industry. In this spirit, Krugman (1990) sets a two 
regions model describing trade patterns and factor shares in the spirit of Lenin’s 
claim of two stages o f capitalism mentioned in ‘Imperialism’. Each region has two 
sectors -manufacturing and agricultural sectors-, and has non-growing labor force. 
The assumption that labor force is fixed implies that there exists a maximal amount 
of capital that can be used in manufacturing sector, and the region with higher 
capital growth, i.e. with higher profit rate due to increasing returns, will eventually 
exhaust the labor force in the economy. Thus, there will be a second phase in trade 
of capital flows equalizing profit rates, i.e. a fall of profit rate in the developed
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region following an increase of profit rate in the backward region. This might even 
mean the industrial region begin to import labor since dynamics of such a setting 
results in deterioration of wages in less capital intensive region while workers in 
more capital intensive region enjoy higher wages, what Krugman calls them as 
‘labor aristocracy’. After all, the model assures that Lenin’s (1934) claim of two- 
stages of capitalism indeed holds.
What differs in this setting fi-om the previous discussion is that the laws of 
motion of profit and wage rates are determined through the initial difference in the 
capital levels of the regions which groimds the uneven development between two 
regions. When the first-starter fully industrializes, she will be in need for external 
liberahzation in order not to stay in a routine production vicinity with profit rates 
and thus interest rates go down to zero as Schumpeter (1989) narrates. Technology 
in the model is as a result of increasing returns with external economies rather than 
a shifter fi’om a stable and routine production point to a new unstable point in a 
decreasing returns production scheme.
Krugman’s model explicates file uneven development and historical 
accumulation for external liberalization though some of the results do not match 
with the historical facts. Simply, there would be huge demographic flows fi'om the 
backward region to the industrial one since economies of scale is in effect, but we 
do not see such huge flows, contrarily we see restrictions to demographic flows and 
unemployment problem in the industrial region. Moreover, capital may not flow in 
this setting if labor is mobile since economies of scale is in effect, that is, increasing 
capital in the industrial region further sustains profit rates with the flow of labor
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from the backward region while there is still low levels of profitability in the 
backward region.
2.2.3 Heterodox Models
The last thirty years’ of economic analysis is dominated by the orthodox 
views while having a neoclassical macroeconomic underpinning. The alternative 
theories of the 20* century classics seem to have been forgotten. The very core 
motifs of these classics are the theory of value and factor payments. The Marxian 
and Keynesian influences are characteristic of these writings and even of today’s 
heterodox camp. The Marxian tradition goes back to Lange, Mandel, Baran, 
Sweezy and Dobb. The British-Cambridge scholars like Robinson, Kalecki, and 
Kaldor, however, blend the Keynesian and Marxian theories. Today’s post- 
Keynesian views stem from the aforementioned Cambridge scholars while today’s 
Marxian economists follow Mandel, Baran, Sweezy and Dobb.
Post-Keynesian Theories o f Distribution
Post-Keynesian models of distribution are not easily accessible. In 
particular, there is not a single post-Keynesian model, but a whole variety, with 
different, sometimes contradictory assumptions. For instance, Kaldor assumes fiall 
employment, which is denounced as "more neo-classical than neo-Keynesian" 
(Marglin, 1984). Kaleckians emphasize the role of variable capacity utilization, 
whereas this has not been an issue for Robinson's equilibrium analysis 
(Stockhammer, 1999). But at the very core are an independent investment fimction 
and saving propensities that differ between income classes (i.e. Kaldorian savings
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equation) in these writings. Thus the distribution of income between capital and 
labor plays a crucial role.
Despite the fact that the building blocks of post-Keynesian models differ, 
prominent ones can be summarized briefly. For Kalecki (1943) the profit share, 
and inversely the wage share, is given by the degree of monopoly, which in turn is 
determined by the degree of competition, tiie extent of non-price competition and 
the organizational strength of labor. Hence the real income distribution is 
determined by structural factors that are fixed in the short run. He also proposes 
that savings propensities of labor is zero, but as Pasinetti (1962) did, it can be 
modified as saving propensities of workers are low compared with that of 
capitalists. Accordingly, Kaldor (1980) perceived forced savings as the main 
determinant of saving scheme in the economy, which is a consequence of relative 
autonomy of the state.
The Kaleckian model of distribution in a Keynesian fashion delineates that 
output growth is inversely related with the profit rate and saving propensity of 
capital owners. This simplistic model proposes that more share of the profit should 
turn into investment in order to sustain growth while attaining a sustained or 
increasing profit rate. As a demonstration following Stockhammer (1999), the 
supposed relation can be derived fi*om equations (7), (8) and (9).
{1) Y  = I + wN + C r
(8) S  = Sw(Y- R) + srR , in the simplified form, S  = srR
(9) Y = I + ( l - n ) Y + ( l - S R ) n Y
where Y, I, S, s, w, R and N, following conventional notation denote income, 
investment, savings, saving propensities, wages, profit and employment
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respectively and n = R /  Y , ihs exogenously given profit share, and Cr the 
consumption by capitalists. At the equilibrium level of income we get the 
Kaleckian multiplier,
(10) Y* = (l/sRit)I
Stockhammer (1999) further constructs two variants of Post Keynesian 
models that circumfuse distributive features between capital and labor. The 
variance between the models stem from the aforesaid differences in assumptions. 
The first of these models narrate the Kaldor-Robinson contemplation of 
distribution. The economy is assumed to operate at full capacity although there is 
not an assumption of full employment for the Robinson type model; savings are in 
the Kaldorian fashion; and finally investment is determined by the level of profits. 
With the assumption of full capacity utilization, Stockhammer (1999) shows the 
clear tradeoff between wages and profits, and output growth, thus profitability, is 
inversely related with savings out of profits and wages. With introducing the 
assumption of variable capacity utilization, however, the economy is not on the 
possibilities frontier and thus there is not a direct tradeoff between wage income 
and profits.
The second model, the one in Kaleckian fashion, assumes oligopolistic 
market structure since oligopolists can maintain idle capacity due to irreversibility 
of investment projects, flexibility in the face of changing economic conditions, or 
indivisibilities in the production process. Nevertheless, the assumption of under­
capacity is not valid if the market structure is other than oligopoly or monopoly, 
i.e. markets under monopolistic competition or perfect competition. Again
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following Stockhammer (1999), the basic structure of the economy can be 
identified with the following equations.
{ \\) I /K  = a + bK + cz
(12) S/K = sTtz
The equilibrium condition is satisfied with equating savings and investment 
condition, where z is the capacity utilization, Y/K; n is now the profit share, R/Y; 
and finally K is the stock of capital in the economy. The equilibrium values of 
investment and capacity utilization is,
(13) z* = (a + bn)/(sn-c)
(14) (I/K)* = a +bn + c(a + bTt)/(sn-c)
The results of comparative static analyses demonstrate the negative relation 
between profit share and capacity utilization, yet the relation between capital 
formation, I/K, and profit share is not determinate. Stockhammer (1999) argues 
that there will be a positive capacity effect and a negative profit share effect on 
investment, what the net effect will be cannot be answered a priori; and thus, two 
regimes are possible depending on the relative strength of capacity and profit 
effects in the investment function. If the capacity effect outweighs the profit effect, 
growth of output is wage-led, whereas if the profit effect is stronger than the 
capacity effect, growth of output is profit-led (Stockhammer, 1999).
The implications of these models are that the negative relation between 
profit and wage shares poses the confiict between capital and labor. However, the 
Kaleckian model introduces a conditional statement for this relation with the 
assumption of variable capacity utilization. In political terms, the new conditions 
of external liberalization set forth by neoliberal transformation brings wage
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suppression in Robinson-Kaldor model, whereas the model a la Kalecki 
necessitates the economy to operate at full capacity for such a relation strictly to 
hold.
Moreover, starting out from the antagonist relation between capital 
formation and profits, and the Keynesian demand leakage with the wage erosion, 
such writers as Crotty and Dymsky (2000) propose that global neoliberal regime 
pushed the world economy into a stagnant era accompanied by increased 
unemployment, rising inequality, and crises with severe outcomes.
Structuralist Models
Early structuralist economists such as Raul Prebisch mentioned how the 
evolution of terms-of-trade pauperized the third world, and prescribed that the 
production composition of third world should change in order to take them out of 
the vicious circle they are in. Due to lower income elasticities of raw materials 
than for industrial goods, the primary good exporting third world at the periphery 
faces with deteriorating terms-of-trade relative to the manufactured good exporting 
industrial center (Agenor and Montiel, 1999). However this interpretation and 
policy prescription would be effective in the long-run since the structure of the 
production has to be changed.
New structuralists, on the other hand, focused on the short-run defects of 
neoliberal policies and designed policies accordingly. Such new structuralist 
writers as Taylor and van Wijnbergen follow mainly Kalecki, Kaldor, and 
Cambridge scholars despite the fact that Taylor (1983) acknowledges the reader as 
to blend the ideas of many scholars besides the aforesaid names. The basic tenets 
of new structural perspective are more or less the same with the Post Keynesians
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handled above. In a paper, Taylor (1990) identifies main hypotheses of structuralist 
view as,
“1- Many agents possess significant market power.
2- Macroeconomic causality in developing world tends to run from injections 
such as investment, exports, and government spending, to leakages such as 
imports and savings.
3- Money is often endogenous,
4- The structure of the financial system can affect macroeconomic outcomes in 
important ways.
5- Imported intermediate and capital goods, as well as direct complementarity 
between public and private investment, are empirically important.”
The main difference from the Post Keynesians is that new structuralists 
focus on structural adjustment mechanisms. Taylor (1983) lists the main structural 
adjustment mechanisms as follows:
“1- Output meets demand, made up of autonomous elements like investment and 
output-sensitive components like private consumption.
2- Supply is fixed, so demand must adjust to it. One means through price changes 
that limit consumption (in the simplest model) to total output minus 
investment.
3- Some component of demand varies freely to bring overall balance -  
competitive imports or government spending are two possibilities.”
In an economy where production requires labor, imported intermediate 
inputs and capital; wages, the remuneration of labor, are determined institutionally. 
The situation of the economy determines which alleged adjustment mechanisms 
listed above will be applied. But in demonstrational purposes, the basic adjustment 
mechanism can be showed following Taylor (1983). The first identity to be used is 
the markup pricing formula for an oligopolistic market.
(15) P = (1 + r)(wb + eP*a)
P  is the price of output produced domestically, P* is the price of imported 
intermediate goods, r is markup rate, w is the wage rate, b is the labor-output ratio, 
a is the imported intermediate good-output ratio, e is the exchange rate, X  is output, 
C is consumption, K is capital stock, and finally sr is saving propensity of capital
25
owners. Then comes the equation for profit rate; inserting the markup identity into 
profit rate -(15) in (16)- we get the compact form of profit rate which reflects the 
positive relation between markup rate, capacity utilization (u = X/K) and profit rate.
(16) r  = (P X - w bX - eP*aX)/PK
(17) r = (x/(l+x))(X/K) = (x/(l+x))u
The next step is to find the saving-investment balance of the economy. For 
this end, gross national product identity and consumption identity is molded to get 
equation (20),
( \ S ) X= C +I+E (there is no government in the setting)
(19) PC = wbX+ (1 -  SR)rPK
(20) g  + e -  (x'^ (p + sjt)r = 0
where g is capital formation, //ÜT; (p is the share of intermediate imports in variable 
cost; and finally s is exports to capital stock. Investment demand can be written as, 
(^Y) g  = Zo + Zir + Z2U
Equations (20) and (21) govern the system as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Moreover, real wage equation can be expressed with manipulations based on 
previous equations as,
(22) o) = w/P = ( l -  (p)/(l + x)b
26
Figure 2.1 ofa Ete(rease In Markup Rate
Now think of an attempt to increase markup rate which simulates the 
reaction of capital owner in the face of competitive pressxires of external 
liberalization. Then, with the system dynamics ruled by equations (20) and (21), the 
saving supply schedule -equation (20)- and investment demand schedule -equation
(21)- rotate clockwise, while capacity utilization schedule rotate counterclockwise; 
thus, real wages contract. In political terms, capitalist prefers to make income
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redistribution from wage earners to profit recipients. And, this is the craft of the 
capitalist to survive in the market.
For tractability reasons and subjective choice of the research, Taylor’s 
model will be followed in the empirical testing of the hypothesis which will appear 
as a separate chapter in the proceeding text. With this empirical testing, I will try to 
demonstrate that the neoclassical hypothesis that increased competitiveness with the 
introduction of external liberalization would lead to decreased profits, and thus 
factor payments converge to their natural levels of what the classical marginal 
theory dictate is not valid under the political and social milieu. Thus, it is to be 
validated that profit is an entity that is created, extracted, and distributed by the 
authoritative actions within the borders of class interactions.
2.3 Financial Liberalization and Distribution
Capitalist mode of production inherently has the aspect of instability in the 
sense that there is no central planner who decides the next period’s reproduction 
scheme. Profit remains the decisive factor of which commodity and how much to 
produce; thus profit becomes an end in itself, which then turns into the decisive 
factor that determines not only production but also reproduction. To quote 
Luxemburg (1951),
“...Capitalist reproduction, however, to quote Sismondi's well-known dictum, 
can only be represented as a continuous sequence of individual spirals. Every 
such spiral starts with small loops which become increasingly larger and 
eventually very large indeed. Then they contract, and a new spiral starts again 
with small loops, repeating the figure up to the point of interruption. This 
periodical fluctuation between the largest voliime of reproduction and its 
contraction to partial suspension, this cycle of slump, boom, and crisis, as it has 
been called, is the most striking peculiarity of capitalist reproduction.”
In today’s terms, the magnitude of business cycles, what Luxemburg calls
them as periodical fluctuations, depends on some factors other than the gluts or
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shortages that originate from the production decisions of individual firms. The 
increased inflows and outflows of money, which can cause bubbles in the 
economy, are other factors of increased business cycles. For the overall economy, 
considering both the real and monetary factors, Foley and Smith (2002) for 
instance explain price (in)determination by a model of thermodynamic economy, 
more precisely, of a model representing entropic inclinations of the capitalist 
economy.
That the increased circulation of finance capital in the last two decades is 
proven to cause increased cycles (see, e.g. Crotty and Dymsky, 2000). The past 
two decades have seen the construction of a globe-girdling network of financial 
centers and offshore financial havens. These centers and firms provided an 
infiustructure for financial speculation where the instability of exchange rates and 
interest rates in the neoliberal regime supplied the requisite motivation. With the 
changing structure of and innovations in financial intermediation, the role of 
financial markets has drastically changed.
Broadly speaking, there were three upsurges in international financial 
activity, and these can be listed as increased extent of international lending, 
financial innovation and financial agglomeration. The number and range of 
financial instruments have changed dramatically since 1960, and new problems of 
management and regulation have arisen with them. Most of these new instruments 
appear to be very esoteric instruments, which are difficult to understand, monitor 
or control.
Moreover, an important point to note about is that the recent growth of 
international lending has not just dramatically increased the range of capital
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mstmments, but changed the whole character of capital flows. Late 19* century 
lending was mainly long-term in nature, going to finance investment in real assets 
which is no longer so.
Increased global financial activity, flows of capital independent of the 
production process, and speculative profit search led to the emergence of financial 
crises, causing lesions on the developing economies. Injection of short-term 
financial flows, in other words hot money, into the so-called “emerging markets” 
by global rent-seeking capital was observed in the last two decades. In addition, 
the countries absorbing these short-term fimds expand like bubbles, which in turn 
cause a kind of “pseudo growth” in these countries. At a point, creditors see the 
risk of insolvency and as a result of herding behavior, they immediately exit the 
economy. Consequently, the economy exhibits pendulum movements, having high 
growth rates before the crisis following negative growth rates after the crisis.
The impact of financial openness on the distributive patterns in production 
is not a direct one but it affects the shares of capital and labor through expanded 
amplitude and pitch of business cycles. The increased fi’equency of crises hurts 
labor shares severely. In times of trouble, firms respond to adverse market 
conditions by cost reduction and supply shrinkage. Cost reduction in this 
circumstance is made through wage reduction and labor lay-offs. Mainly, the 
encouraging rhetoric of capital in these times is that workers to remain calm and 
faithful and that they are in trouble as well.
Diwan (1999) portrays the after-crisis labor market conditions in his paper 
titled as “labor shares and crises”. And his major findings are that the labor share 
usually falls sharply following a financial crisis, recovering only partially in
30
subsequent years, and the labor shares have been trending down in most regions 
over the past two decades, while Hecksher-Ohlin theorem predicts that wages in 
the poor country increases while wages in the rich country decreases after external 
liberalization. Besides this, Diwan (1999) also notes that profit rates also fall in the 
post-financial crisis period but the damage to capital is not as much as the damage 
to labor remimerations.
Moreover, exchange rate fluctuations form another source of changing the 
balance between labor and capital shares. Under flexible exchange rate regimes, 
the influx of capital into the domestic financial markets pulls the exchange rate 
down increasing the real wages in terms of foreign currency while domestic 
producers force for devaluation in order to gain competitive advantage and wage 
cost reduction.
Furthermore, for a market economy, competitiveness is important within its 
markets for it to work efficiently. However, crises wipe out medium and small­
sized firms, with large firms remaining in the markets, which gain immunity and 
power. In line with this, remaining firms speak of the trouble they are in, which 
legitimizes wage reductions and labor lay-offs and consequently weaken the 
bargaining power of labor.
2.4 Power Relations Connecting the State and Capital
Power relations between classes within the society are further ingredients 
that form the distributional patterns among social classes. Power is associated with 
factors of production not directly but via ownership, and that among the factors of 
production only one contributes power to the owner: capital. Thus, production is
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dominated by those who control and supply capital -by a constantly diminishing 
number of the magnates of capital who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this 
process of transformation (Marx, 1970). As a result, state, due to the need for an 
intermediary negotiator, appears to be the regulatory factor between classes.
The concept of relative autonomy of the capitalist state has been put forward 
in the Marxian political economy writings to refer specifically to the relations 
between the state and the dominant classes or fractions. As proposed by Poulantzas 
(1980), it was firmly rooted in a structuralist approach to Marxism that the political 
dais is constructed on economic relations, specifically class domination and class 
struggle. A corollary of this statement is that the capitalist state is governed by the 
logic of capital accumulation, and therefore the maia function of the capitalist state 
is to perpetuate the interests of the capitalist class and secure the reproduction of 
capitalist system in the long-run.
As Poulantzas (1980) states, while the capitalist state has some autonomy 
vis-à-vis the dominant class, this autonomy is relative since it cannot go beyond 
the limits posed by the reproduction needs of the system. Poulantzas’ formulation 
of the relative autonomy of the capitalist state originates from the conflicting 
interests of power blocs within the capitalist class. The state remains a device for 
maintaining the political xmity of the dominant power blocs and their hegemony 
over the subordinated classes. The relative autonomy of the state can go as far as 
allowing the state to intervene the class conflict in order to compromise 
occasionally with the dominated class, which in the long-run turns out to be useful 
for the economic interests of the dominant class.
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Accordingly, state occasionally engages in surplus creation in order to 
satisfy the needs of capital, while sometimes allowing capital to practice surplus 
extraction amid the increased conflict among power blocs. Surplus creation turns 
the zero-sum dominion game of the conflicting power holders into a non-zero- 
sum-game or a game of positive gains for all the power blocs within the dominant 
class of the game. When the relaxed conditions that give some freedom for capital 
reverse with the intensifying hectic psychology of subordinate classes, state 
engages in to rectify the situation with restituting the relations with the subordinate 
classes via social policies and allowing labor to use some relative negotiation 
power. This means that capital will always ask for an increased share from the 
economic surplus while in order to relieve the increased tension of subordinate 
classes in times of increased appropriation and social turmoil risk, it will allow 
labor to experience relatively improved gains compared to the previous inferior 
situation.
2.5 Institutional Adjustments
External liberalization encompasses deregulation of markets, which implies 
redistribution of rents. In this subsection, the reader will be informed with product 
and labor market deregulations and their consequences. It should not be forgotten 
that institutional adjustments are done within power relations, thus the discussion 
will be carried on with the help of the previous section.
In order to discuss the distributional outcome of deregulation adjustments, in 
particular the product and labor market deregulation, it is convenient to overview 
the main ideas beforehand. Crudely to define, the underlying intention of
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deregulation in product and labor markets is to augment the market dynamics such 
that the markets clearly respond and adjust contemporaneously to the new 
conditions, e.g. shocks, demand fluctuations. Thus, entry and exit barriers, level of 
competition in product markets, and bargaining power of workers, unionization, 
government regulations such as social security, unemployment benefits in labor 
markets can be defined as regulatory indications.
The alleged effects of simultaneous deregulation in the two markets are 
decreased rents in product markets and lowered bargaining power in labor markets, 
which in turn decrease the share of labor. Deregulation of product market 
encompasses easing of entry conditions into the market, which causes to decrease 
the rents in product market with the increased competition. Deregulation of labor 
market encompasses deunionization of workers, abdication of government 
regulations such as social security, unemployment benefits, which in turn weaken 
the bargaining power of labor. New entries would not be instantly responsive to de 
jure deregulation leading to lagged reduction of prices in product markets. Thus, in 
the short-run workers are worse-off while capital owners enjoy profits for a while 
and in the long-run profits will decline with new entries. The total impact of these 
processes on labor remunerations is indefinite in the long-run since it depends both 
on price drops and wage erosions.
On the other hand, a one-sided deregulation, typically a deregulation in 
labor market, apparently reduces the share of labor within the economic surplus 
created in product markets. Though the orthodox rhetoric proposes that high 
unemployment rates in many countries originate from the high regulation scheme in 
labor markets and thus legitimizes the deregulation in labor markets, this biased
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redistribution can be explained through political course and power relations, i.e. the 
political dominance of capital owners, or governmental desires such as to create 
exportable surplus, or to generate forced savings in a Kaldorian sense may be 
encouraging factors, which is shaded under the terms “well-functioning” and 
“competitive”. Extending the terms “well-functioning” and “competitive” brings 
flexibility of the components of production process, which indicates the adjustment 
phenomenon required by the cyclic nature of such an economic structure. In this 
circumstance, flexibility of production patterns conduces to remain an open door for 
the capitalist to enjoy profits or stay in market by tidying the composition of 
production patterns. The adaptation ability of the capitalist is not as the neoclassical 
theory suggests and is limited by the structure of the market and environmental 
factors of the economy.
Accordingly, the main tool for the capitalist for adaptation to the changing 
market environment is labor saving techniques, in other words labor market 
flexibility, which work through changing the labor share in the output either by 
increasing the number of employees in a period of increased gains and vice versa or 
changing the labor cost via adjusting the wages in a band of subsistence wage level 
and market prices. This poses the conflict between labor and the capitalist. 
However, the so-called Bowley’s Law suggests that the labor share in output has 
inertia and does not vary much in the short and medium terms (Diwan, 1999). This 
can be attributed to the aforementioned institutional factors of the labor markets 
such as the strength of trade luiions, minumun wage law, wage indexation and 
restrictions on labor mobility, which limit the adjustment ability of firms to changes 
in relative prices, factor supply, and aggregate demand conditions. Even so, if the
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labor share is a constant, the living standards for the laborer change with the 
ongoing of the economy that has become more fluctuating, which also contradicts 
with the aforesaid statement (Diwan, 1999). Consequently, the terms “surplus 
extraction” or “surplus creation” become legitimate under the neoclassical rhetoric.
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CHAPTERS
A Retrospective Digression on the History of Macro Adjustments in
the Countries Analyzed
Looking through a historical perspective elucidates the dynamics of today 
which helps to draw future prospects. This chapter intends to provide such a 
perspective for each country. But in order to understand the dynamics of individual 
countries, general history should be drawn beforehand.
The post-war Bretton Woods economic setting came to a point where the 
new regime of accumulation was forcing the mode of regulation of the era through 
exhaustion. Mass production of the golden age was no longer profitable since 
wages in the welfare states of north were increasing, demand for mass 
consumption goods were saturated, and the barriers on south were preventing the 
capital in north to access more demand. So, there had to be an adjustment of both 
production techniques, fi’om Fordism to post-Fordism, and the accessibility levels 
to outside markets, from inward oriented economic structures to outward oriented 
ones. So to speak, the balance of power between domestic governments and real 
and financial capital seeking international mobility swung decisively toward the 
capital, which can be defined as “free market revolution”.
In fact, liberalization process is not merely the demolition of economic 
barriers between countries. Liberalization can be seen as a package implanted to 
the developing countries. Therefore, we have to talk about the set of policies
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brought by liberalization process. After early 70s, as Harvey (1989) narrates, with 
the introduction of liberalization,
- The size and functions of government were reduced and shifted to market 
dynamics.
- In this fashion, privatizations came to the agenda.
- Safety nets and social-welfare programs have been cut.
- Workers’ rights have been restricted, unionization have been retarded.
- The counter-cyclical role of government expenditure in sustaining 
aggregate demand has been deregulated.
- Global capital was in need of market flexibility, including labor market 
flexibility. Due to this need, production mode has changed as was mentioned 
earlier, from Fordist to post-Fordist production featuring subcontracting, bid-price 
competition, just-in-time inventory methods and out-sourcing.
- Regressive redistribution from labor to capital has helped sustain profits 
just they were being eroded by increased competition and interest payments. 
Fxmctional distribution between labor and capital skewed towards capital.
- State also regressed from income-transfer programs and protection for 
workers; also nourished both domestic and foreign capital by subsidies, adjustment 
of legal infrastmcture, and lowering prices of row or intermediate inputs supplied 
by state-held industries.
Thus, the conditions for global capital to diffuse into the developing world 
were set. Having these commonalities in mind, I begin to narrate the economic 
histories of countries in the context of accumulation and distribution in the 
following subsections.
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3.1 Mexico
Following policies based on import substitution that resulted in two decades 
of sustained growth averaging more than 6 percent per year, Mexican economy 
faced with the debt crisis of 1982, which had prolonged impact on the main 
economic and social indicators such as growth rate falling as low as to more than -4 
percent as seen in Table 3.1 and inflation averaging 90 percent. The new 
government that came to power in 1983 was forced to adopt a tight fiscal program. 
The collapse of the world oil prices and the rise of the interest payments on 
domestic and foreign debt with high inflation, reaching implausible levels such as 
60% of total expenditure as seen in Table 3.2, made the fiscal tightening policy 
ineffective and deepened the crisis of 1982. With the adoption of a heterodox 
stabilization program in 1987, domestic and external public debt started to erode 
gaining speed with large privatization revenues, which led to the recovery of 
Mexican economy. While price stability and economic stability were being 
maintained, Mexico went on a path of integration with the world markets. It was a 
eommon idea at that period that Mexico as a successful reformer and emerging 
market, was appearing as a Latin American economic miracle. This optimism rose 
with the approval of North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the 
wide-ranging economic reforms like anti-poverty program that were put into 
practice by Mexican government (Ros and Lustig, 1999).
In the advent of NAFTA’s approval, the Mexican economy was heading 
towards a financial crisis and entering its worst recession since the Great 
Depression of 1929. In line with the crisis, political instability with the presidential
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elections and opposing groups were in effect causing a chaotic environment. The 
devaluation of peso worsened the debt position of the economy that brought an 
international rescue package to the economy in 1995.
Figure 3.1 Real W ages and Markups in Mexican Manufacturing
Industry
-real wages —♦—markup
Inspection of the real wage and markup trends through Figure 3.1 gives 
upward movement of markups and cumulating characteristic of real wages around a 
constant value over time for the Mexican manufacturing industry. The determinants 
of such a trend can be exposed through econometric inspection, but with a brrd-eye- 
view, it can be said that in an era of ‘apertura’ (or liberal transformation), markups 
did not deteriorate with the expected competitive environment. New capital 
formation seems decelerated after the crisis in 1982 with the gradual abdication of 
state from production activities. Thus, state seems to be a source of capital 
formation in the economy. With the reluctance of capital owners to append new 
capital to the production process due to cost and risk of expanding production
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activities that may lower profits, suppressing real wages through inflationary 
processes, and weakening the negotiation power of labor, markups followed such a 
trend seen in Figure 3.1. Though unemployment rate seems to increase before and 
after the 1994 crisis, imemployment in Mexico, compared with other Latin 
American countries, does not constitute a serious problem since the rates are low 
due to the cheap labor supply of Mexico to North America.
Table 3.1 Selected Indicators for Mexican Economy
Years GDP growth
Per Capita GDP 
Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation (% of GDP)
1980 9.23 6.56 27.16
1981 8.77 6.22 27.38
1982 -0.63 -2.86 22.91
1983 -4.20 -6.27 20.75
1984 3.61 1.43 19.86
1985 2.59 0.48 21.18
1986 -3.75 -5.69 18.54
1987 1.86 -0.15 19.26
1988 1.25 -0.71 2.50 22.56
1989 4.20 2.22 22.94
1990 5.07 3.10 23.14
1991 4.22 2.30 3.00 23.33
1992 3.63 1.74 3.10 23.29
1993 1.95 0.11 3.20 21.00
1994 4.42 2.56 4.20 21.72
1995 -6.17 -7.81 5.70 19.82
1996 5.15 3.54 4.30 23.11
1997 6.77 5.24 3.40 25.86
1998 5.03 3.58 2.90 24.32
1999 3.75 2.32 2.00 23.51
2000 6.86 5.33 2.20 23.30
2001 -0.32 -1.74 2.10 20.89
2002 0.90 -0.54 2.40 20.26
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Table 3.2 displays the pre-90 mflationary period of creating exportable 
surplus via gaining the competitive advantage of devaluation and eroding wages. 
After 1990, the attempt to join NAFTA required some stability criteria, and for this 
purpose, an anti-inflationary attempt with debt reduction aiming was launched.
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which caused economic stagnation. Such an attempt was ended with the cliché end 
of such attempts: crisis. Immediate IMF credit was the remedy for 1994 crisis. Real 
interest rates rose with the credit need of government. Thus, the economy went into 
post-crisis stagnation.
Table 3.2 Selected Financial Data for Mexican Economy
Years Inflation CPI Real Int. Rate
IMF Credit (current 
billion USD)
Interest Paym. 
(% of Tot. Exp.)
1980 100.76 0.00 10.65
1981 104.48 0.00 15.58
1982 164.78 0.22 15.84
1983 343.81 1.26 37.53
1984 626.72 2.36 35.55
1985 672.18 2.97 39.23
1986 90.10 4.06 52.98
1987 131.33 5.16 60.84
1988 342.96 4.80 59.54
1989 3079.81 5.09 51.43
1990 2313.96 6.55 45.02
1991 171.67 6.77 30.59
1992 24.90 5.95 23.35
1993 10.61 4.79 16.50
1994 4.18 7.01 3.86 13.41
1995 3.38 14.23 15.83 18.12
1996 0.16 10.57 13.28 18.64
1997 0.53 9.75 9.09 13.70
1998 0.92 12.55 8.38 14.70
1999 -1.17 13.20 4.47 16.27
2000 -0.94 9.85 0.00
2001 -1.07 0.00
2002 0.00
2003 0.00 ,,
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
3.2 Colombia
After a period of tight import-substitutionist economic stance, Colombia 
shifted relatively towards an outward looking stance in 1967. Average annual 
growth rate of GDP was 6.6 percent in 1970-75 and 5.4 percent in 1975-80 and the 
volume of exports expanded at a rate of 6.1 percent a year with imports having 8.4
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percent of growth per year (Garcia and Garcia, 1991). The shift in trade policy 
reached its climax in 1980 and a rearrangement of trade policy that reversed the 
previous openness aiming was made in 1981 with the inclining appreciation of the 
local currency, which severely hurt the growth of exports. This was a turning point 
for Colombian economy since a new period of inward economic policies came out 
with gradual construction of trade barriers. Outward orientation years of the 
Colombian economy before 1980 pushed the economy into a balance-of-payments 
crisis while providing high growth rates. In contrast, the protectionist period after 
1980 witnessed considerably slower growth rates, yet with a more stabilized 
macroeconomic environment (Roberts and Tybout, 1996). By the time this reversal 
began to be implemented, the real wages settled on a relatively stable plateau as 
seen in Figure 3.2.
1990s brought a new wave of liberalization with a rapid process of structural 
reforms to Colombia. An addition to standard structural reform packages for the 
countries in the region was the attempt to increase social sector spending to 
eradicate the sizable iuequality accumulated in the country. This combination of 
active social policy and liberalization has raised difficulties as rising fiscal strains 
and besides this, it brought more instability than before, decelerated the growth rate 
and weakened the tradable sectors. Thus, there occurred a need for rearrangement 
of power between state and capital owners. Real wage trend got a downward kink 
while profit rate trend put an end to its downward trend of the four years of 90s as is 
seen in Figure 3.2. These troublesome features of the economy with international 
shocks and uncertain environment resulted in the strongest recession of the past 30 
years in 1998-99.
43
Coming to the evolution of markups and real wages, Figure 3.2 discloses a 
negative correlation between the two variables. While wages seem to have an 
upward trend over the post-1980 era. Table 3.3 portrays the drastic increasing trend 
of unemployment rates over time, which reflects the deliberate cost-reduction 
attempt of the employers through labor-saving techniques against the rising real 
wages.
Growing cost reduction desire of employers in order to compete 
internationally with rising basic social security contributions that has been 
implemented by the state, and with rising internal and international economic 
turmoil conduced to implausible levels of unemployment. Unemployment grew so 
fast that in year 2000 it reached around 20 percent. In line with the decrease in 
employment, capital formation decreased as well. These naturally meant a total 
contraction in production.
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Table 3 .3 Selected Indicators for Colombian Economy
Years GDP growth
Per Capita GDP 
Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation (% of GDP)
1980 4.10 1.81 9.10 19.06
1981 2.26 -0.01 8.10 20.63
1982 0.95 -1.22 9.10 20.50
1983 1.58 -0.55 11.10 19.91
1984 3.36 1.22 13.10 18.95
1985 3.09 0.98 14.00 19.03
1986 5.84 3.70 13.00 18.00
1987 5.37 3.29 11.10 19.06
1988 4.06 2.02 10.10 20.65
1989 3.42 1.40 8.90 18.49
1990 4.01 1.99 10.20 18.50
1991 2.40 0.41 9.80 15.95
1992 3.89 1.89 9.20 16.71
1993 5.39 3.36 7.80 21.28
1994 5.84 3.79 7.60 25.54
1995 5.20 3.15 8.70 25.80
1996 2.06 0.17 12.00 22.15
1997 3.43 1.47 12.10 20.92
1998 0.56 -1.32 15.00 19.61
1999 -4.05 -5.75 20.10 12.54
2000 2.81 0.97 20.50 12.22
2001 1.39 -0.34 14.70 15.14
2002 2.10 0.88 17.90 23.07
2003 3.74 2.00 15.89
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Post-1980 era was characterized by inertial inflation for Colombian 
economy as seen in Table 3.4. High interest rates were forming disincentive in 
production, thus leading to stagnation. High interest rates were the outcome of 
financial repression formed by the outside banks that give credit according to the 
credit rationing signals of some independent organizations. On the other hand, the 
Betancur government was reluctant to make a formal agreement with IMF, which 
contrarily was demanded by creditor banks. The burden of high real interest rates 
was that the share of interest payments in total expenditure has risen throughout the 
decade.
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Table 3.4 Selected Financial Data for Colombian Economy
Years Inflation CPI
Real Interest 
Rate
IMF Credit (current 
billion USD)
Interest Payments 
(% of Tot Exp.)
1980 26.54 0.00 4.21
1981 27.48 0.00 4.65
1982 24.55 0.00 5.38
1983 19.76 0.00 4.99
1984 16.14 0.00 4.09
1985 24.04 0.00 5.57
1986 18.88 9.04 0.00 7.32
1987 23.30 14.37 0.00 10.44
1988 28.11 11.69 0.00 10.62
1989 25.84 14.72 0.00 9.99
1990 29.14 12.98 0.00 9.83
1991 30.39 16.73 0.00 10.76
1992 27.03 11.09 0.00 8.46
1993 22.61 9.27 0.00 10.67
1994 23.84 -3.37 0.00 9.18
1995 20.96 20.08 0.00 9.18
1996 20.24 21.50 0.00 12.23
1997 18.86 14.88 0.00 12.69
1998 20.35 23.50 0.00 17.41
1999 11.21 14.12 0.00 17.61
2000 9.49 7.27 0.00
2001 7.97 0.00
2002 6.35 ,, 0.00 ,,
2003 7.13 ..
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
High real interest rates led some liberalization of foreign borrowing and 
expansionary monetary policy in mid-90s as seen in Table 3.4. Interest rates began 
to fall, but the reduction was not rapid enough that interest rates suspended on a 
plateau, thus capital inflows did not decelerate leading to revaluation, and economic 
slowdown. In order to rectify the situation, policies aiming exchange rate 
depreciation, and fiscal restrains with further reduction in interest rates were 
undertaken. However the situation got worse with speculative attacks and 
Colombian government went on an IMF agreement in 1999 for the first time after 
around 40 years.
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3.3 ChUe
As was the worldwide convention during the 1960s, Chile pursued an 
inward-oriented development strategy. 1970 elections resulted in the triumph of 
socialist Allende government and this intensified inward-oriented development 
policies. The new government began to confiscate private production units, 
appropriated large farms under Agrarian Land Reform, increased public sector 
wages, shifted the exchange rate regime to fixed exchange rate and put a 
generalized system of price controls (Agenor and Montiel, 1999). These policies led 
to large increases in government spending and money base since public spending 
was also financed with central bank credits. Chilean economy was under a massive 
radical change and the social and economic indicators were drifting apart: Real 
GDP grew by 9 percent, unemployment fell below 4 percent and real wage grew by 
17 percent in 1971 with increasing public debt and inflation. The year 1973 was a 
turning point for Chilean economy; the military coup brought the junta regime of 
Pinochet, which caused the economy to make a u-tum. This meant a structural 
adjustment process comprising fast transformation of the economy into neoliberal 
framework. Privatization of the previously confiscated economic units, opening the 
economy to world markets, fiscal austerity and price stabilization were included in 
the adjustment program. The average tariff rate declined from 105 percent in 1974 
to about 12 percent in 1979 (Roberts and Tybout, 1996).
After an initial period of recessionary shock, industry began to recover in 
1976 with the labor-saving features of the recovery policies and the employment 
losses remained permanent during the stabilization period of 1976-81. Balance of
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trade in industrial products worsened considerably in response to trade 
liberalization and appreciation of the national currency. Emergence of powerful 
conglomerates was another feature for the period, which changed the economy 
towards a more concentrated market structure (Roberts and Tybout, 1996).
For the period considered, exchange rate appreciation was a serious 
problem, which finally became a trouble for the economy in 1982. Current account 
deficit, profit squeeze of the firms and contraction of large external capital inflows 
forced the government to devalue the national currency. A major recession followed 
devaluation and rmemployment reached roughly 30 percent in 1983. Labor’s share 
in this period eroded enormously. But still a requirement of surplus creation was 
apparent and government took control of major private banks, initiated a 
recapitalization program, consolidated the industrial loans, re-programmed the 
long-term debts, and lowered corporate income taxes. Industry was in need of 
protection as well and trade barriers were reconstructed in this period. After the 
industry gave sound signals, these measures were recessed gradually.
Sustained gro\^h has been maintained in the last decade as seen in Table 3.5 
but this did not retrieve the labor market conditions at the end of the period due to 
the accumulated malfunction of the economy, which hides itself throughout the 
decade resulting in a crisis. It seems that increased real wages with the state 
intervention to heal the problem of inequality spread through the society has 
triggered employers to restore the increased total wage costs to the levels that they 
desire to achieve via labor shedding.
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Although the economy was open to a social turmoil, state-oriented 
redistribution policies towards eliminating poverty and income gap raised real 
wages and this resulted in a drop in the total number of people living in poverty, 
from 47% in 1987 to slightly more than 20% at the present time, as a result of 
widening of the job market during the 1990s and an increased overall income. 
Figure 3.3 represents real wage trend, which stands besides the counter-movement 
of markup rates.
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Table 3.5 Selected Indicators for Chil ean Economy
Years GDP growth
Per Capita GDP 
Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation (% of GDP)
1980 8.15 6.54 10.40 21.02
1981 4.74 3.16 11.30 22.70
1982 -10.32 -11.68 19.60 11.28
1983 -3.79 -5.27 14.60 9.85
1984 7.97 6.29 13.90 13.68
1985 7.12 5.42 12.10 17.19
1986 5.60 3.90 8.80 18.88
1987 6.59 4.85 7.90 22.24
1988 7.31 5.53 6.30 22.77
1989 10.56 8.70 5.30 25.15
1990 3.70 1.92 5.70 25.11
1991 7.97 6.18 5.30 22.55
1992 12.28 10.41 4.40 23.81
1993 6.99 5.23 4.50 26.50
1994 5.71 4.02 5.90 24.10
1995 10.63 8.95 4.70 25.79
1996 7.26 5.71 5.40 26.88
1997 7.54 6.05 5.30 27.23
1998 3.92 2.53 7.20 26.64
1999 -1.14 -2.43 9.90 21.42
2000 5.38 4.04 8.30 23.44
2001 2.80 1.53 7.90 20.69
2002 2.10 0.88 7.80 23.07
2003 3.30 2.02 22.12
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
90s brought liberal measures and this increased vulnerability of the 
economy. Current account deficit rising to implausible levels and short-term capital 
inflows recessing in the crisis periods with disloyalty were the determinants of 
vulnerability. In 1998, current account deficit reached a sum of 4.144 million 
dollars, which represents 6.3% of production. This situation reached its deepest 
depths toward the end of the decade. It simply did not manifest itself earlier due to 
the unusual influx of capital, mainly in the form of foreign direct investment, which 
led to an increased balance in the capital account.
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Table 3.6 Selected Financial Data for Chilean Economy
Years
Inflation
CPI
Real Interest 
Rate
IMF Credit (current 
billion USD)
Interest Payment 
(% of Tot. Exp.)
1980 35.14 14.27 0.12 2.84
1981 19.69 34.48 0.05 1.38
1982 9.94 50.98 0.01 1.56
1983 27.27 9.31 0.61 3.91
1984 19.86 22.84 0.78 4.27
1985 29.46 7.08 1.09 6.31
1986 20.61 3.49 1.33 5.68
1987 19.89 6.49 1.46 8.27
1988 14.68 -0.20 1.32 10.09
1989 17.03 21.01 1.27 8.24
1990 26.03 22.79 1.16 9.52
1991 21.78 6.07 0.96 10.29
1992 15.43 10.91 0.72 6.84
1993 12.73 12.39 0.48 5.95
1994 11.44 6.87 0.29 4.71
1995 8.24 8.08 0.00 3.74
1996 7.36 15.23 0.00 2.77
1997 6.14 11.40 0.00 2.10
1998 5.11 17.46 0.00 3.08
1999 3.34 8.46 0.00 1.47
2000 3.84 10.38 0.00 2.04
2001 3.57 0.00 2.08
2002 2.49 0.00
2003 2.81 ..
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
3.4 Argentina
The structural adjustments towards a more autarkic national economic 
structure were handled by the military-oriented hybrid regimes after the military 
coup in 1930. The nationalist and populist Peron regime also followed this mode of 
regulation after the Second World War. As the implementation of measures of 
inward-looking development strategy responded, manufacturing growth gained 
impetus. Following the Peronist regime, non-civilian governments were on power 
imtil the emergence of the restoration of Peronist regime in 1973.
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The junta regime coming to power after the Peronist government handled 
structural adjustment policies of openness aiming. The content of the adjustment 
package was in line with the world trend of economic change. The junta regime 
quickly passed the laws for trade liberalization. Before 1980, inflation rate was 
already passed out the level of 100 percent annually. The junta regime’s response 
was to open the economy so as to force prices down through international 
competition. Tariffs were lowered and the local currency peso became overvalued. 
This produced an enormous growth of imports.
Although the new civilian government went on an anti-inflationary program 
with price controls and social policies such as monthly adjustment of real wages, 
inflation mounted to implausible levels. The interesting part of the story was that 
various sectors of bourgeois class were approving of the situation. Speculative 
earnings were a matter of passivity to the situation. The economic situation would 
have allowed at that time the introduction of deflationary policies, and that 
presumably would have had a broad level of support and good possibilities of 
success; instead there was a blind adherence to the liberal orthodoxy that led to 
further exacerbation of the situation. Table 3.7 summarizes the lost decades of 
Argentine economy via financial data. IMF dependency and high levels of inflation 
are clearly seen.
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Table 3.7 Selected Financial Data for Argentine Economy
Years Inflation CPI
Real Interest 
Rate
IMF Credit (current 
billion USD)
Interest Payment 
(% of Tot. Exp.)
1980 100.76 0.00 0.00
1981 104.48 0.00 16.67
1982 164.78 0.00 23.33
1983 343.81 1.17 11.41
1984 626.72 1.10 13.56
1985 672.18 2.31 11.48
1986 90.10 2.74 7.79
1987 131.33 3.85 8.06
1988 342.96 3.68 7.44
1989 3079.81 3.10 7.40
1990 2313.96 3.08 8.46
1991 171.67 2.48 10.85
1992 24.90 2.31 9.61
1993 10.61 3.52 7.42
1994 4.18 7.01 4.21 8.15
1995 3.38 14.23 6.13 10.05
1996 0.16 10.57 6.29 11.05
1997 0.53 9.75 5.87 12.82
1998 0.92 12.55 5.44 14.46
1999 -1.17 13.20 4.48 17.06
2000 -0.94 9.85 5.06 19.94
2001 -1.07 13.98 22.10
2002 25.87 14.34
2003 13.44
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
In 1989, Argentina was on the edge of an economic crisis. High inflation 
rates led to erosion of wages and increased internal debt. The high degree of 
protection and large amount of government subsidies the local producers enjoyed 
formed the general idea of economic inefficiency, which resulted in implementation 
of further liberalization policies in 1991. The most important item in this package 
was the convertibility law that declared the fixing of national currency to dollar 
indicating the equivalence of one dollar and one peso. It did not outlaw the 
modification of exchange rate but clearly stated the backing of peso in the central 
bank reserves as dollars, and this caused compulsory storing of reserves backing 
100 percent of the money supply in the market. By doing this the government hoped
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to convince the financial world of its commitment to economic reform and stability. 
The Law of State Reform opened the door of privatization for state-owned 
enterprises. Convenient with these measures, government reduced trade barriers 
further. Consequently, Argentine economy became trustworthy once again for the 
creditors and a take-off period of three years originating from flowing external 
credits started: GNP grew steadily, interest rates became more reasonable, 
consumption increased and inflation fell drastically.
Unemployment grew to inadmissible levels as the result of privatizations 
and overvalued peso; fixing to dollar caused the exporting sectors of the industry to 
engage in surplus extraction. Government also attempted to retrieve the situation 
via surplus creation: Exporting sectors of the economy were subsidized instead of 
devaluation for gaining competitive power; in fact it would not be a rational action 
since credibility had to be sustained.
Three years of growth ended with the recession in 1995, which produced a 
6.8 percent contraction and a new trend of growth began by 1996. Before coming to 
year 2000, which encompassed the major crisis that Argentine economy faced ever, 
the economy followed an unstable path.
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As a contrast, Argentine manufacturing industry markups do not behave as 
the other Latin American countries over time. As usual, average real wages in 
manufacturing sector seen on Figure 3.4 erode in the past 20 years. The pattern 
reveals that the episode of open economy severely hurt both capital and labor 
shares. Besides the trend in growth rates, labor market conditions deteriorated as 
shown in Table 3.8. Crisis years within adjustment periods worsened labor market 
conditions. These events increased social conflict in recent years leading to strikes, 
protests, and political turmoil. Disinflation programs pushed the economy into 
severe recession. As is seen in Table 3.8, growth rates fell below zero for the last 
four years.
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Tab! e 3.8 Selected Indicators for Argentine Economy
Years GDP growth
Per Capita GDP 
Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation (% of GDP)
1980 4.15 2.60 2.30 25.26
1981 -5.69 -7.11 4.50 22.69
1982 -4.96 -6.39 4.80 21.75
1983 3.88 2.31 4.20 20.89
1984 2.21 0.67 3.80 19.96
1985 -7.59 -8.97 5.30 17.59
1986 7.88 6.28 4.40 17.46
1987 2.91 1.41 5.30 19.55
1988 -2.56 -3.94 6.00 18.64
1989 -7.50 -8.76 7.30 15.51
1990 -2.40 -3.68 7.30 14.00
1991 12.67 11.19 5.80 14.64
1992 11.94 10.46 6.70 16.70
1993 5.91 4.51 10.10 19.06
1994 5.84 4.43 12.10 19.94
1995 -2.85 -4.14 18.80 17.94
1996 5.53 4.17 17.20 18.08
1997 8.11 6.74 14.90 19.37
1998 3.85 2.55 12.80 19.93
1999 -3.40 -4.60 14.10 17.87
2000 -0.52 -1.74 15.00 15.93
2001 -4.41 -5.24 18.30 14.17
2002 -1.09 -1.16 17.80 11.96
2003 8.72 3.35 15.13
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
3.5 Venezuela
As an oil-producing country, Venezuela went into a new phase of 
accumulation process with the rise in oil prices in 1973. The extra surplus created 
with the high oil prices was channeled to state-oriented development program, 
which aimed to form indigenous industries for import-substitution aiming. With the 
nationalization of oil and iron industries, the financing of state-based development 
program expanded. Although the welfare state was promoting industrialization to 
form indigenous bourgeoisie, the attempt to lower wage goods helped to improve 
labor’s living standards. Employment was low due to artificial tightness of labor
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markets and the share of labor in GDP was higher than capital (Anglade and Fortin, 
1990).
With the fall of income generated by oil sales after 1980, Venezuelan 
economy went into trouble. As a result of this, the boom period of 73-79 followed 
by a stagnation period that led the cease of state capitalism and gave way to free 
market transformation. After four years of the deregulation and openness period, it 
was understood that these policies proved to be problematic. The supposed increase 
in capacity utilization and realistic prices for capital goods and labor wages were 
realized. GDP fell by 5.6 percent and investment down by 26.3 percent by 1983 
(Anglade and Fortin, 1990). Both markups and real wages tended to fall and 
unemployment rate reached up to 18 percent in this period.
The period was followed by an orthodox IMF stabilization program, which 
resulted in contraction. GDP and capital formation fell further, unemployment 
reached its highest level of the last 25 years while profitability began to follow an 
upward trend as seen in Figure 3.5 with only two years of decrease till 1990.
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During 1991-95, Venezuelan economy was subject to declining oil prices, 
political instability (1992-93), and a major banking crisis (1994-95). By early 1996 
the economic situation was characterized by accelerating inflation, declining non­
oil GDP and foreign reserve problems (1998, Ahneida et al.). Government signed a 
stand-by agreement with IMF in 1996 which was proposing the usual set of policies 
such as fiscal strains, financial confidence, improved resource allocation etcetera. 
These policies were regressive for labor gains as seen in Figure 3.5. Policies aiming 
deregulation like privatization, deregulation of social security system, decreasing 
severance payments and social safety nets etc. meant further losses for working 
population. As seen in Table-9, unemployment rates increased in the last 10 years 
due to the mentioned policies.
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Table 3.9 Selected Indicators for Venezuelan Economy
Years GDP growth
Per Capita GDP 
Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation (% of GDP)
1980 -4.42 -7.28 5.90 26.39
1981 -0.36 -3.14 6.30 24.43
1982 -2.07 -4.63 7.10 27.69
1983 -3.76 -6.15 10.10 12.21
1984 1.42 -0.98 13.00 17.50
1985 0.21 -2.10 13.10 18.51
1986 6.53 4.08 11.00 20.94
1987 3.55 1.10 9.20 24.57
1988 5.84 3.21 7.30 27.95
1989 -8.59 -11.03 9.90 12.71
1990 6.48 3.36 10.40 10.22
1991 9.74 7.16 9.50 18.70
1992 6.06 3.62 7.70 23.72
1993 0.25 -2.00 6.70 18.76
1994 -2.35 -4.48 8.70 14.15
1995 3.97 1.75 10.30 18.11
1996 -0.20 -2.29 11.80 16.55
1997 6.37 4.19 11.40 21.04
1998 0.17 -1.83 11.20 21.87
1999 -6.09 -7.93 14.90 18.10
2000 3.21 1.24 13.20 17.54
2001 2.79 0.86 12.80 19.72
2002 -8.88 -10.56 17.10
2003 -9.22 -10.85 11.56
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Relations with IMF brought slowdown in growth, increase in the share of 
interest payments in total expenditure, and interestingly high positive real interest 
rates in the first half of 90s and negative interest rates in the second half of the 
decade. This abrupt economic tableau also brought lower rates of growth and 
increased unemployment. Though Venezuela is one of the main petrol-producing 
economies, share of interest payments in total expenditure, as seen in Table 3.10, 
rose while growth rates started to crawl.
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Table 3.10 Selected Financial Data for Venezuelan Economy
Years
Inflation
CPI
Real Interest 
Rate
IMF Credit 
(current billion USD)
Interest Payment 
(% of Tot Exp.)
1980 21.54 0.00 7.77
1981 16.05 0.00 6.88
1982 9.66 0.00 7.53
1983 6.34 ,, 0.00 8.31
1984 11.57 -7.66 0.00 12.12
1985 11.38 -0.98 0.00 11.12
1986 11.54 9.81 0.00 10.85
1987 28.14 -21.12 0.00 17.82
1988 29.47 -8.42 0.00 12.08
1989 84.46 -35.26 1.00 20.79
1990 40.66 -4.36 3.01 15.71
1991 34.21 12.96 3.25 16.32
1992 31.42 10.17 2.95 16.29
1993 38.12 21.45 2.68 19.13
1994 60.82 -5.03 2.64 23.59
1995 59.92 -7.93 2.24 25.61
1996 99.88 -35.31 2.20 22.16
1997 50.04 -10.65 1.62 11.62
1998 35.78 21.07 1.23 11.50
1999 23.57 4.07 0.74 13.57
2000 16.21 -1.29 0.20 11.50
2001 12.54 0 11.28
2002 22.43 ,, 0
2003 31.09 ..
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
3.6 Turkey
After the first military coup in 1960, the Turkish economy followed a 
planned, import-substitutionist, policy-based structure. With the formation of the 
State Planning Organization, five-year economic plans were implemented resulting 
in fairly good growth rates, which continued until the beginning of the 80s. At the 
beginning of this planned-economy period, the Turkish economy had already had 
interactions with the IMF (the 1958 foreign debt consolidation, for instance) and 
relations with the IMF became more and more intense as time passed and debt 
grew.
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The economic crisis of 1973, political instability of the 70s, the 1971 semi­
military coup changed the ongoing structure of the economy. The second military 
coup in 1980 was a benchmark for the Tmkish social and economic life -indeed, 
the end of 70s was a benchmark for most of the countries throughout the world-. 
The 24* of January decisions, which were prepared for a summit between the IMF 
and the government in 1979, declared a new perspective -a  liberal perspective- for 
the Turkish economy. The decisions brought reforms for opeimess aiming first at 
commodity trade liberalization in 1980 and finishing with financial liberalization in 
1989. In this period, the Turkish economy faced chronic inflation that rose each 
year. Real wages also started to decline after 1980.
The main economic policy characteristic of the 1983-87 period was the 
suppression of wages in order to leave high mark-up rates for the capitalist elite 
who were expected to be more competitive in global markets. Reducing the 
domestic demand through wage extraction and creating exportable surplus were the 
dxial effects of such a policy. The share of wage-labor in private manufacturing 
value added receded from 27.5% to 17.1%; and in public manufacturing from 25% 
to 13%. In this process, the average mark-up rate in private manufacturing 
increased from 31% to 38% as seen in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6 Real W age Costs and Markups in Turkish Manufacturing
Industry
d?^ df^ o?»^  dS  ^o5  ^ oi^ di^ o5  ^df^ o5^ o5  ^d?^ d[^ of^ d5^
-Real Wage —♦—Markup
Source: SIS Manufacturing Data.
During this period, exports rose by 19.7% per annum in dollar terms and the 
real gross domestic product, following the low-point of the 1978-80 depression, 
rose by 5.4% per annum. However, the performance of fixed investments did not 
follow this pattern. In the private sector, gross fixed investments initially contracted 
by 5.3% in 1981-82, and increased by 12.3% during 1983-87. Decomposition of 
this path reveals that only a small portion of this amount was directed to 
manufacturing. The rate of growth of private manufacturing investments has been 
on the order of only 2.1% per annum. This resulted in a significant anomaly as far 
as the official stance towards industrialization was concerned: in a period where 
outward orientation was supposedly directed to increase manufacturing exports 
through significant price incentives and subsidies, the share of manufacturing 
investments declined substantially.
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The economic figures that appeared in 1988 were signals of exhaustion of 
such a set of policies and the need for a renewal in the set of policies became 
apparent. Diagnoses inferred through all economic indicators of 1988 were 
reflecting a stagflationary macro environment. As seen in Table 3.11 and 3.12, the 
rate of growth of GDP was only 2.1%, and the inflation rate accelerated to 75%. 
Real wage earnings hit their lowest point, but then recovered quickly beginning in 
1989, the starting point of the new populist phase. With the upcoming elections and 
rising labor movements in 1989, state felt to engage in rectifying the situation with 
restituting the relations with the labor via social policies and allowing labor to use 
some relative negotiation power. Real wages in manufacturing increased by 90% 
from 1988 to 1991. Thus, the classical accumulation episode based on wage 
suppression had come to a halt by 1989.
63
Table 3.11 Selected Indicators for Turkish Economy
Years
GDP
Growth Per Capita Growth Unemployment
Gross Capital 
formation 
(% of GDP)
1980 -2.45 -4.60 18.16
1981 4.86 2.41 ,, 17.87
1982 3.56 1.02 10.90 16.95
1983 4.97 2.39 12.10 16.29
1984 6.71 4.09 11.90 16.18
1985 4.24 1.74 11.20 16.51
1986 7.01 4.61 18.85
1987 9.49 7.13 ,, 25.67
1988 2.12 -0.07 8.40 25.14
1989 0.25 -1.90 8.60 23.47
1990 9.26 6.82 8.00 24.35
1991 0.93 -1.03 8.00 22.72
1992 5.98 3.97 8.30 23.86
1993 8.04 6.01 8.70 27.61
1994 -5.46 -7.20 8.40 21.48
1995 7.19 5.24 7.50 25.47
1996 7.01 5.07 6.50 24.55
1997 7.53 5.61 6.70 25.11
1998 3.09 1.28 6.80 24.18
1999 -4.71 -6.34 7.70 23.35
2000 7.36 5.56 6.60 24.51
2001 -7.49 -8.99 8.50 16.78
2002 7.94 6.24 10.60 21.32
2003 5.79 4.17 23.01
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
For a brief overview, it can be said that 90s brought crises, which made the 
Turkish economy fragile. The first crisis was in 1994, and with the contagion of 
1998 world financial crisis, the situation became more serious leading the economy 
to have closer relations with IMF. For some years, the growth rates dropped under 
zero and severe recessions were observed. There were several attempts -IMF 
programs- to decrease the inflation rate, which were xmsuccessful. Febmary 2001 
brought a new crisis, resulting in a deep recession and political instability; after this 
crisis the economy began to recover again, which is a normal process for a post-
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crisis period because of the devalued currency, decreased government spending, 
rearranged debt payments, and reduced wages.
Table 3.12 Selected Financial Data for Turkish Economy
Years
Inflation
CPI
Real Int. 
Rate
IMF Credit (cxirrent 
billion USD)
Interest Paym, 
(% of Tot. Exp.)
1980 11.02 -55.10 1.05 2.507837
1981 36.58 -9.06 1.32 5.064203
1982 30.84 21.77 1 ..
1983 31.4 18.74 1.57 6.500394
1984 48.38 -3.24 1.43 8.267179
1985 44.96 1.95 1.33 8.656304
1986 34.62 11.99 1.09 13.07362
1987 38.85 24.39 0.77 14.97322
1988 73.67 14.55 0.30 15.72278
1989 63.27 -16.67 0.05 15.90829
1990 60.31 1.16 0.00 18.27746
1991 65.97 13.84 0.00 14.05186
1992 70.07 10.48 0.00 11.98903
1993 66.1 7.03 0.00 14.08344
1994 106.26 -10.89 0.34 19.67271
1995 88.11 5.12 0.68 12.244
1996 80.35 15.93 0.66 12.50359
1997 85.73 15.06 0.59 26.45113
1998 84.64 19.12 0.39 36.848
1999 64.87 -8.86 0.89 36.38218
2000 54.92 -4.30 4.18 41.79553
2001 54.4 7.69 14.12 49.98666
2002 44.96 4.06 22.09
2003 21.29 7.30 ,,
Soijrce: World Development Indicators, World Bank
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CHAPTER 4
Econometric Modeling
In the theoretical chapter, I have presented models that illustrated the 
pressures for and consequences of external liberalization. In that chapter, the intent 
of the neoclassical theory stressing on external liberalization was mentioned as 
forming competitive pressure and thus attaining the “natural” distributive rule: 
marginal payments of factors. A corollary of this statement is that competition 
would erode profits. As was mentioned in the theoretical chapter, rather than the 
neoclassical contemplation that the distributional patterns are passive outcomes of 
the firee interplay of market forces, I regard profit as a politically and socially 
determined entity that is created, extracted, and distributed by the authoritative/ 
administrative actions under specific structural parameters. Consequently, contrary 
to the neoclassical theory I expect profits to resist against pressures of competition 
brought by external liberalization, which was affirmed by other models illustrated 
in the theoretical chapter. Thus, it is convenient to test this hypothesis, which will 
be the aim of this chapter. I will probe the resistance of markup rates -as proxy to 
profit rates- to some of the variables that were listed previously for the 
manufacturing sectors of selected Latin American countries and Turkey as a 
contrast. Time series and panel data econometrics are used in order to delineate the 
sensitivity of markup rates on such a set of variables since the rudimentary data
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available do not allow for an expanded subsectoral panel data analysis. It would be 
much explanatory if a subsectoral panel data analysis for each individual country’s 
manufacturing industry could be made. Such kind of an analysis could give 
information on the concentration of manufacturing sectors, and sectoral evolutions 
for each country in the post-1980 era. As a prospect, future research would 
delineate such questions provided that reasonable data is available.
The main source for the data is World Development Indicators, which is a 
large data set for a large number of countries. In addition to this data set, 
manufacturing real wage and markup rate series originate from Milanovic. Specific 
for Turkey, the SIS Manufacturing Industry Annual Series data set is utilized. 
Regressions cover 22 years of aimual data due to availabiUty, and outliers reduce 
this number.
For the ordinary least squares estimation, the specification for the sought 
relation is assumed to be linear and as follows:
MRt = « ( + PiOt + P2Ut + P3log(RWf) + St
And for the pooled regression, the system of estimation equations is as
follows:
MR_ARGt = a, + Pi(0_ARG^ + p2LOG(RW_ARG,) + p3(U_ARG,) 
MRjCHLt = a, + pi(0_CHQ  + P2LOG(RW_CHL,) + p3(U_CHQ 
MRjCOLt = at+  Pi(0_COL,) + P2LOG(RW_COL,) + P3(U_COL,) 
MR_MEX, = a, + p,(0_MEXt) + p2LOG(RW_MEXt) + p3(U_MEX,) 
MR_VEN, = a ,+  pi(0_VENt) + P2LOG(RW_VEN,) + P3(U_VEN,) 
MRJWRt = a, + pi(OJVRt) + P2LOG(RW_TUR,) + p3(U_TURt)
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Other panel regressions using generalized least squares and seemingly 
xinrelated regressions are employed as well, but for space concerns the system of 
equations of these regressions will be demonstrated in Appendix-C.
The dependent variable, MR, indicates markup rate for the manufacturing 
sector of the respective country. To portray the capital and labor shares, markup rate 
is used as an instrument since it provides a good proxy on the profitability of 
capital, and for a better xmderstanding of how the shares of labor and capital vary it 
is to be exposed. Assuming markup pricing is used as the pricing mechanism, the 
pricing rule for the capitalist will be a parameter multiplied by the total cost per 
output including labor cost per output. The “gross profit margin” or “markup rate” 
can be foimd if the parameter is refined firom the total cost by subtracting 1. It is 
convenient to define profit as the value of the gain fi’om output over the value of 
capital used in the production process. Arrangement of the two definitions results in 
the revelation of direct relation between profit rates and markup rates and capacity 
utilization, defined as the output-capital ratio in most of the structuralist writings 
(see, e.g. Taylor, 1983).
The specification is made up of an intercept term and three independent 
variables. O stands for openness, U stands for capacity utilization rate, and RW  for 
real wages. The abbreviations after these variables for the pooled regression 
indicate the individual countries. Openness is identified as the sum of imports and 
exports over gross domestic product. As a proxy for the capacity utilization 
variable, we use the share of investments in gross domestic product, except for 
Colombia where GDP growth rate is used. This usage forms reciprocity between the 
proxy variable (investment share) and the actual variable, U, such that negative
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coefficients reflect a positive relation between capacity utilization and share of 
capital increments in GDP. For Turkish and Argentine ordinary least squares 
regressions, dummy variables are used to retrieve some of the series for crisis 
periods rather than resorting to filtering methods like Hodrick-Prescott filter or 
band-pass filter. It was found that dummy variables absorbed much of the 
insignificance of these series in the regressions and improved the diagnostics 
substantially. For the panel regressions, no such additional variables are used.
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CHAPTER 5
Analysis of Econometric Results
Systematic attempt to document a wide range of regularities across 
developing countries with diverse experiences with structural change, which is an 
effort of forming a general developing county structure, can only be assembled with 
a data of reasonable quality. Thus, I restrict my analysis to only six coimtries where 
I could have obtained such data within the period encompassing structural 
adjustments.
A bird-eye’s observation of raw data with the help of markup figures for 
each country previously exhibited reveals an upward movement of average markup 
rates despite increased openness for each country. As an exception, Argentine and 
Colombian manufacturing industry patterns does not show resistance. The main 
channel of immunity seems to be regressing share of labor reflected as either 
maintenance or decline of real wages throughout the period. Coming to formal 
analysis, markup rates are regressed on openness, reciprocal of capacity utilization 
and logarithm of real wages with ordinary least squares for each country, and 
further panel regressions are conducted with the same variables and countries in 
order to look for a general pattern across countries. The results are tabulated in 
Appendix A.
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The negative coefficients of real wages, which were found to be significant 
at 1 percent level, reflects Marxian dynamics throughout the period, which narrates 
the negative correlation between labor remunerations and capital’s share. Turkey 
displays a contrast carrying a positive real wage coefficient, which corresponds to 
“extended” Srqffian dynamics with persistence of markup rates against wage 
increases. On the other hand, the pooled regression asserts that the negative 
correlation between markups and real wages can be generalized to the overall 
coimtries in the sample. Combined with this result, negative coefficients of capital 
formation as a share of GDP for Argentina, Chile and Turkey and positive 
coefficient of GDP growth rate in the regression for Colombia suggest that 
increasing capacity utilization has a positive relation with profits for these 
countries. A quick glance at the unemployment rates of each country, the 
proposition that this was maintained via labor-saving becomes apparent. Mexican 
manufacturing industry seems not to obey this proposition since it has opposite 
impact on profit margins.
On the other hand, while opeimess has a statistieally insignifieance problem 
in general except for Mexieo in the ordinary least squares regressions, capacity 
utilization has a statistically insignificance problem in the pooled regression. 
Interestingly, openness has a positive but a small effect in magnitude on markup 
rates of Mexican manufacturing industry. The openness indicator for the remaining 
eountries differs such that for Turkey, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia it has 
negative sign while for Chile it has positive sign. Comparing relative magnitudes 
with respect to real wages, openness is less dominant in determining markup rates 
for Turkey while the opposite statement is valid for Colombia. For the pooled
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regression, however, openness is more dominant compared to real wages. Given the 
diversity of these results, our verdict is that the econometric evidence is 
inconclusive, at best, on the relationship of profit margins vis-à-vis the degree of 
opeimess.
The coefficients reveal that the response or speed of adjustment of markups 
in spite of the export penetration and import allowance, changes in the amplitude of 
real wages and yearly capital increments or decrements was fast enough throughout 
the period considered. Turkey’s stance is on the opposite giving relatively slow 
response of markup rates against aforesaid variables.
Putting things together, the results of the employed econometric model 
characterizes the period aggrandized as a classical accumulation episode based on 
wage suppression. The sector imder analysis seems to be immune to expected rise 
of competition as a result of opening to world markets for the bunch of countries 
discussed. Wage extraction appears as the main tool for capital to sustain the profit 
trend in the post-1980 period. Increased unemployment rates and negative sign of 
real wages in the regressions support this proposition. Consequently to say, the 
process of both trade and financial liberalization has, in general, been inadequate to 
commence the erosion of profits due to expected intensification of competition in 
the manufacturing sector.
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CHAPTER 6
Concluding Comments
In this thesis, the axis of investigation was the response of capital to the 
changing economic environment set forth by globalization, which intensified in the 
post-1980 period. The political economy of external liberalization and deregulation 
was discussed theoretically in order to enunciate the general intention of the 
empirical work. Starting from theories of value and market structures as 
preliminaries, a demonstration of distributional patterns regardiag different 
economic settings was presented. It was concluded that patterns of factor payments 
are determined by means of social and political practices and power relations 
among classes contrary to the contemplation that distributional patterns are passive 
outcomes of the free interplay of competitive market forces. Thus, the corollary of 
this conclusion that profits resist against pressures of competition was tested 
econometrically.
Regarding the trajectories of real wages in the manufacturing industries of 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Turkey, it was attempted to 
formalize on these observations to deduce econometric hypotheses on the patterns 
of trade liberalization, labor remunerations and profitability. For this purpose, 
empirical questions were put forward and investigated using time series and panel
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data econometric analysis for the manufacturing sectors of aforementioned 
countries over the 1980-2001 period.
Observations on raw data portray a general decline in real wages and rise of 
markups in manufacturing sectors of the countries studied throughout the period. 
Besides the real wage erosion, the period is also characterized by the rising 
unemployment rates, which delineates deterioration of labor market conditions. 
Combining these observations with the results of ordinary least squares regressions, 
it is foimd that labor as a factor of production was a channel for maintaining 
profitability xmder the post-1980 era, which encompasses structural adjustment 
reforms and opeimess to the world markets. Turkey formed a contrast in the sense 
that real wages, which has a positive relationship with profit margins, seem to act as 
demand stimulant if the domestic demand conditions in industrial commodity 
markets are taken into accoimt. As in the aforementioned Kaleckian model of 
distribution, growth of output may be wage-led after 1989. Another explanation of 
this irregularity may be on power relations: state, with the upcoming elections and 
rising labor movements, allowing labor to use some relative bargaining power in 
1989.
Another result of the regressions was that capital formation as a share of 
GDP, which is a proxy to capacity utilization, showed negative impact on profit 
margins in Argentina and Turkey, while results for Mexico, Venezuela and Chile 
failed to pass the significance test. Colombia drew a different portrait with a 
positive relationship more in line with the theory. It seems that capital owners were 
reluctant to engage in productive investment in Turkey and Argentina while there 
were mechanisms to maintain profitability such as increasing productivity via labor
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shedding. Finally, openness was found to be statistically insignificant with profit 
margins.
Panel regressions also confirmed the results of individual regressions such 
that markups display negative correlation with real wages as a common pattern 
through the countries in the sample. Interestingly, openness, which was statistically 
significant, came out to be positively related to markups in the panel regressions 
contraiy to the results I got in the individual regressions. However, capacity 
utilization had statistically insignificance problem in the panel regressions.
Putting things together, the results of the employed econometric model 
characterizes the period aggrandized as a classical accumulation episode based on 
wage suppression. The sector under analysis seems to be immune to expected rise of 
competition as a result of opening to world markets for the bunch of countries 
discussed. Wage extraction appears as the main tool for capital to sustain the profit 
trend in the post-1980 period. Increased unemployment rates and negative sign of real 
wages in the regressions support this proposition. Consequently to say, the process of 
both trade and financial liberalization has, in general, been inadequate to commence 
the erosion of profits due to expected intensification of competition in the 
manufacturing sector.
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